Welcome

Dennis Jones is a Jamaican-born international economist, who has lived most of the time in the UK and USA, and latterly in Guinea, west Africa. He moved back to the Caribbean in 2007. This blog contains his observations on life on this small eastern Caribbean island, as well as views on life and issues on a broader landscape, especially the Caribbean and Africa.

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Showing posts with label Financial issues. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Financial issues. Show all posts

Wednesday, May 05, 2010

Caught Between A Rock And A Hard Place: The IMF Reports On The Regional Economic Outlook

The IMF's latest quarterly regional report on Latin America and the Caribbean has just been released (see report). As for the world as a whole, growth is occurring in the region, but it is uneven. Much of the growth in the region depends on external developments, and here we have a cleft stick for tourist dependent countries, like Barbados, which have seen tourism and associated foreign investment suffer (see more on this below). The IMF analysis is clear and speaks much for itself, but a few points are worth highlighting. The press release notes that the outlook for smaller economies remains difficult:

“But within that regional picture, countries with strong ties to global financial markets are likely to stage a more vigorous recovery, helped by their access to ample external financing and by strong prices for their commodity exports. On the other hand, some of the smaller economies will experience more sluggish growth, and some of those will even contract. Accordingly, policy approaches will have to vary considerably to ensure a sustainable recovery across countries.”

In assessing the varied outlook, the IMF comes up with a grouping named 'net commodity importing countries with large tourism sectors'. This group comprises Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. These countries depend primarily on tourism for their current account revenues. In general, they have high external debt burdens but otherwise are not closely integrated with external financial markets. They experienced sizable terms-of-trade losses during 2000–08, given their limited goods exports base and their reliance on imported fuels.

'Growth in the commodity importing tourism intensive countries has been marked down and is expected to perform worse in the current cycle than in previous episodes of global stress. The relevant external conditions are less benign for these countries. Reflecting strong links to weak employment in advanced economies, shocks to tourism have not fully reversed, and elevated commodity import prices are weighing on activity. Moreover, in some of these countries, high levels of debt constrain the room for policy maneuver. Although some countries managed to implement countercyclical fiscal policy in 2009, the payoff in growth was limited, probably reflecting small multipliers. And fiscal stimulus efforts may be short-lived, given financing constraints in forthcoming periods.' This general picture has its clear image in Barbados.

The report adds: 'Policy challenges in the coming years will correspondingly vary across countries. For many of the financially integrated commodity exporters, the challenge will be managing the upswing of the business cycle. A main theme will be the timing and sequence of exit from the macroeconomic stimulus implemented in 2009, and the adjustment to a more benign external environment. In turn, for many of the tourism intensive commodity importers, the sluggish recovery, coupled with high external and fiscal imbalances, will require difficult policy choices.'

Many of these countries are the filling in a sandwich that is hard to stomach: dependent on growth and strong employment in developed countries that should generate tourists, and push the flow of foreign direct investment (FDI, often also in the tourism sector). The report highlight graphically how that situation is looking bad for many of the region's small economies. 'Estimates of tourist arrivals to the tourism intensive commodity importers suggest that the impact of a 1 percent increase in OECD unemployment implies a contemporaneous decline of 4 percent in arrivals, on average (Box 2.6). For the current downturn, the approximate 3 percentage point increase in U.S. unemployment squares with the average 10 percent decline in Caribbean tourism. Longer-term investments in the form of vacation real estate and other forms of tourism fell concomitantly with short-term vacation arrivals, as household wealth declined in the aftermath of the financial crisis. This is particularly costly for the tourism intensive importing countries, as median FDI (in percent of GDP) had tripled, from below 4 percent in 1996 to more than 16 percent of GDP by 2008. The importance can be observed in the concurrent declines in median unemployment in the region, from more than 16 percent in 1996 to single digits in the most recent years. With the onset of the crisis, FDI fell sharply to 10 percent of GDP in 2009. Employment in advanced economies is expected to improve only gradually, with weak prospects for tourism in the coming years.'

The nail is driven home with 'The weak recovery in the tourism intensive, commodity importing countries will pose a great challenge to policymakers, as elevated debt levels and limited access to financing impose difficult policy tradeoffs.'

The recent concerns about debt and financing could indirectly affect the region through market confidence effects or directly via Spanish banks but also due to general concerns about high debt and deficits levels.

It is worth remembering that one of the mainstays of many of the region's small economies has also been one of its constraints. 'Moving toward more flexible exchange rates, where possible, would serve as a cushion against potential future external shocks.' Holding onto fixed exchange rates has become sacrosanct in many territories, but without proposing that this be dropped one need only look at Greece's plight to see what happens when you cannot devalue your currency in light of severe economic problems.

The IMF report also highlights the burden on the region of the still unfolding financial difficulties of the CL Financial Group and the pending Securities and Exchange Commission fraud charge case against Allen Stanford and three of his financial companies fro running fraudulent investment schemes. The Fund, ever the master of understatement comments 'Both experiences point to the need to improve financial regulation and crossborder cooperation.'

Friday, April 23, 2010

Are The People All Doddery Or Just Imprisoned By Their Points Of View?

The little tempest that has begun to swirl on the island over the past week since the central bank governor published comments and figures about the wider financial cost of building a new prison at Dodds has become more blustery today.

The Advocate leader says 'Gov't should know better' (click link to read or click image to enlarge) and argues that the previous Barbados Labour Party Government showed 'poor reasoning and bad judgment' in its choice of options to rebuild the prison and its selection of a contractor, alluding to the fact that the contractor, Alaskan company, Veco Corp., had executives who were under criminal investigation from 2007 and the 'former chairman and former vice president pleaded guilty to conspiracy, bribery and tax violations'. It draws the connection between a new home for criminals being constructed by those who were themselves involved in 'serious irregularities'. Naturally, it touches on what has confused many: that the cost of the new prison has shifted from B$200 million, to B$289 million, to B$749 million. That is not so hard to understand, as the first figure was an initial estimate of 'general costs'; the second figure was agreed contract amount; the third figure is the total contract figure plus interest to be paid as part of the BOLT (build, operate, lease, transfer) arrangement.

The Nation is on its rival's heels, with an editorial entitled 'Let's reason in prison debate', which talks about how issues can get both emotional and get mired in political point scoring. Its slant is to not question the arithmetic but to plead that 'critical elements went into the decision to build Dodds have been ignored'. It argues that these were made for 'safeguarding the economy from the deleterious fallout' from the fire that destroyed Glendairy prison. Cricket World Cup was in the offing; the security of Barbadians and tourists were 'equally paramount'. It's probably right to argue that 'we do not feel there could have been many Barbadians...who would have disagreed that new prisons (sic) had to be built'. But that does not excuse what appears to have been a case of being economical with the truth about what the country would have to deal with financially. If public comments flying around now are a gauge, it is the case that a good part of the population had no idea that the final cost would be more than the capital sum to build the prison. That reflects a certain attitude on the part of those who govern: we know best what should be shared with the populace and the less, the better. But it also betrays a certain attitude on the part of those governed: not to press for disclosure and to be content with flimsy arguments about major decisions. It has nothing to do with 'a modicum of reason and common sense'. My understanding is that the matter was not pressed that hard by those who were in opposition politics at the time, and are now in government, so it's an awkward falling knife to dodge.

Finally, Clyde Mascoll's weekly column in the Weekend Sun, 'What Matters Most', talks about 'Dusk or dawn'. He, too, talks about the governor's report and the discussion on how economic trends were portrayed. On Dodds, he feels that the treatment of payment of debt service on the lease agreement for Dodds 'justifiably triggered' a response from the leader of the opposition (Ms. Mottley) and the former PM (Mr. Arthur). I wont argue about the governor being selective in his treatment of debt obligations: he was. What I would have preferred to read from Mr. Mascoll (whom we should not forget was Minister of State in the Ministry of Finance in the previous government during important decisions on the matter) was more than 'It has apparently fallen on me to give the public a perspective that offers an alternative understanding of the economic issues confronting Barbados'. He could have said something like the partial treatment needs to be complete and that transparency in the fiscal affairs of government was less than it could and should have been. This is not just my view, but has been written publicly by the IMF in its Fiscal Transparency Report on Barbados. The country needs to see and understand what its forthcoming debt obligations look like, and for how long. We could then have a useful public discussion about how it is envisaged that these will be met.

Wednesday, April 21, 2010

CLICO MOU: Why Did We Have To Wait So Long?

For the life of me, I have never understood why the Government did not make public the Memorandum of Understand (MOU) with CLICO that has supposedly existed for about a year. But, I see that it has now been tabled by the Finance Minister (see Barbados Today and image alongside for extracts). I presume that this was in response to the question from the Leader of the Oppostion that was on yesterday's Order Paper, see below:

*8. Miss Mia A. Mottley (St. Michael North East): To ask the Minister of Finance:

1. Will the Minister of Finance urgently provide to this Honourable Chamber the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding announced in his 2009 Budgetary and Financial Statement signed between the Government of Barbados and Clico Holdings Barbados or any other subsidiary of Clico Holdings Barbados? Will the Honourable Minister also state whether it is his intention to lay this Memorandum in this Honourable House? If so, will the Minister state when he intends to lay the said Memorandum. Will the Minister of Finance further provide the terms of reference of the Government Control Oversight Committee that has been established to have oversight over the sale of financial subsidiaries of Clico Holdings Barbados and their expenditure? Further, will the Minister of Finance indicate if the oversight committee is still operational; and did the mandate extend beyond the six (6) months given at the time of its establishment?

Transparency and accountability in government affairs should have argued for this being presented to the House much sooner, not least so that any matters contained could be discussed fully. We will now listen to the explanation why despite repeated previous requests that this be done that it took so long.

Tuesday, April 20, 2010

What Position Do You Play? The Central Bank Governor Faces Some Tough Tackling

Since presenting his review of the first quarter last week, the central bank Governor has been assailed by several leading members of the opposition Barbados Labour Party about what he did and did not say and how he presented the economic picture, claiming that it was not 'fair and balanced' (see, for example, Nation report 'Economic report missed the mark, says Mottley' and Advocate, April 16, page 3). I'm not really getting into what is brewing up to be some top level political fight, with the current PM/Finance Minister quickly rebutting the claims (see Advocate report). I would not wish to take away the chance for some opportunistic opposition politicking, though it's worth noting that there is a lot that could have been said about many economic developments in many previous quarterly reviews. The discussion has a number of points of interest, most notably the highlighting of the overall cost of the building of a new prison. It's good that past government ministers feel that a fuller picture should now be given of this obligation, which begs the question in my mind why that was not insisted on earlier. That information, which is in the purview of the PM, Finance Minister, and Cabinet, should not be coming to the population now. The country has limited resources and good husbandry of those should be a paramount point in the minds of politicians, together with clear explanations of what the decisions mean at a given time and in the future. Without knowing whether discussions were ever held between previous PMs, finance ministers and central bank governors about the tone and content of the central bank's publication, I will take it that the latest comments will be duly noted, with or without the Governor raising an eyebrow.

What should not be in contention is that the Barbadian people should not be in the dark about the nation's obligations, and it feeds confusion to give no clear or only partial information about these, sometimes in a drip fashion. The details of the Build, Operate, Lease, Transfer (BOLT) agreement for Dodd's Prison may be contentious in some eyes, especially if the options for building of a new prison and its financing were not fully aired in a manner that the public could understand. But the details of this and other BOLT arrangements and other obligations should be known: it's the public's business to know what they have been committed to by elected officials. Looking forward, it should be standard to show the forthcoming government obligations to repay principal and debt service on a loan-by-loan basis, and the underlying terms of the loans should not be any big mystery.

I have also been interested by reports about the Governor's comments about two red flag issues for Barbados. One is the country's foreign reserves and the other is the level of central government debt.

On reserves, the Governor is reported to have said that the current level of reserves (about 20 weeks of imports) is "enough" when compared with an international norm of 12 weeks for 'our kinds of economies'. He added that raising this level would "not be in Barbados' favour". He did argue that "adequate" reserves were needed to protect the value of the exchange rate, but holding reserves are not a good thing as "reserves are ... funds that you have earned and are lending back mostly to the US government". He seemed to dodge the issue of letting reserves fall so that more could be used for domestic purposes, saying that the "issue of credibility needs to be considered" and letting them dip too much would worry people. But, he has opened the door to speculation about that possibility that there is going to be repositioning on the matter and that too may lead to his having to face more heavy bombardments.

The second intriguing repositioning being undertaken by the Governor appears to be in the context of 'constructive dialogue with rating agencies' on how to view Barbados' public debt. The press report suggests that he has been arguing that because much of the central government debt is held by the National Insurance Scheme (NIS), it is not at risk of not being repaid because NIS is only interested in the income from the debt and will roll over the principal because they need the income to pay national insurance claims. He also added that because government and statutory corporations hold bank deposits these should somehow be netted against the debt outstanding, and the position of general government and debt held by non-general government (which would be under 50% of GDP) is perhaps more appropriate. Clearly, the international markets are very sensitive right now to the prospects faced by heavily indebted countries so trying to put your national position in the most favourable light is a good strategy. I don't know if the NIS shares the Governor's views about its holdings of government debt and whether they are not concerned about getting back that principal. Bad news if they are. I'm not clear where the line of argument about cash in the bank takes you: it is not there to deal with debt obligations and has plenty of claims on it for every day operations. In similar vein, foreign assets in commercial banks are not part of the country's reserves, having other calls on them, so the country would not throw those in to show that it has adequate import cover. Nice that it exists but it has another role to play.

Well, Dr. Worrell is not ducking controversy, and opening up a raft of issues for discussion makes for more interesting times.

Monday, April 19, 2010

What should be the focus of the 2010 budget, given the current economic environment?

The following was published in the Barbados Business Authority on April 19, 2010.
BBA Apr 19 2010 Budget Expecations
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The next Budget is already largely prepared. The government unveiled its Medium Term Fiscal Strategy (MTFS) several weeks ago. This set a clear annual adjustment path towards a balanced budget by 2014, from a deficit of about 8% of GDP in 2009, to be achieved by holding revenues broadly constant as a share of national income and cutting spending gradually as a share of national income. So, what will the Finance Minister tell us in the next Budget? If he points to a different path, then one must ask 'What is the medium term strategy meant to be?' Thus, one focus of the Budget should be to confirm the MTFS as a credibile policy framework.

In the near-term, there will be little growth to drive the Barbadian economy.
The major industrial countries on which Barbados relies heavily for tourism and exports are just edging their way out of recession, so will provide litte pulling power. The government expects negative real GDP growth to continue in 2010, on the back of a tourism sector that is still suffering, while positive growth is not forseen until 2011 (+2.6 %). But, while more output may be lacking, the government has the opportunity to focus on getting the country to improve the quality of its outputand be more productive. That means especially making better service a reality across all sectors and having meaningful public sector reforms.

The country still has serious problems centred on government financial operations and the level of government debt.

While the MTFS does not see much increase in the relative share of revenues, the government needs to square that with its commitment to improve tax collection and reduce arrears. Therefore, the Budget needs to explain how revenue collection will be more efficient yet revenue yields will not grow noticeably.

The government has promised in the MTFS to look harder at its spending and aim to get better value for each dollar—in its words, 'focusing on quality spending, and reducing wasteful expenditure will allow the Government to allocate resources to high priority areas'. Part of the Budget focus should be to make that commitment clearer, by identifying what it deems as 'quality' and 'wasteful' and identifying clearly the priority areas that could benefit.

The government should also show how it will fulfill its MTFS commitment to 'seek to effect a prudent debt management strategy over the medium term'. To do that it said 'Emphasis will continue to be placed on accessing long-term funds from international financial institutions to finance public sector infrastructural projects, although there may be selective recourse to external commercial borrowing'. The first quarter funding seems to have been at variance with that, when the government financed its operations entirely by new domestic loans, bonds and treasury bill issues.

The government's other major fiscal concern is how it will reduce the high levels of debt, consistent with the MTFS. Public debt is forecast to decline from about 110% of GDP in 2010/11 to about 91% in 2014/15. The government is already due to borrow US$200m abroad to repay a US$100m loan and add US$100m to reserves to overcome a forecast shortfall in tourism earnings. The government needs to show that this will not raise overall debt levels, worsen debt service ratios, and that this way of covering for weakness in tourism really will be an exception.

Saturday, April 17, 2010

Incidious Trend?

My wife is a pretty sharp cookie and a decent economist, so when she alighted on an article in yesterday's papers ('Paying with gold', Weekend Nation, page 3), I had to take note. She had just read that jewelery was being used in exchange for items such as brand-name clothes and shoes. She asked me "Since when is gold legal tender in Barbados?" Without too much hesitation, I said that it was not, but neither is the US dollar or other foreign currencies, and we see them being offered and accepted quite freely and openly. Our training tells us that things like this can be the thin edges of several wedges. One concerns whether people have lost confidence in the local currency. I think that one does not really apply. Barbados is not suffering very high inflation and the Barbadian dollar's fixed rate to the US dollar has been maintained a key pillar of economic policy for three decades, to the point where one former Governor of the central bank said recently that the fixed rate is 'sacrosanct'. Another concern is whether it's a way to bypass certain administrative barriers.

So, why is it that on the one hand merchants would take jewelery, mainly gold, instead of cash? The police indicate that this is a new trend at stores around Bridgetown that they have discovered as they investigate an increase in robberies of jewelery and cell phones. Most merchants would not normally have the means to assess the value and quality of jewelery and gold. While they may always run the risk of being passed counterfeit Barbadian dollars, they would normally have some recourse to the central bank if they could show that they were unwittingly duped. Who do they know who would willingly take the items from them, rather than being able to use local cash again in their business or depositing it into a bank account? Why take the risk that the goods are stolen or even of dubious quality? Is it that, with gold prices around US$1500 an ounce, they feel that they can speculate on the commodity? Sales, recorded by the movement of merchandise, would have value greater than reflected in cash payments, so there could be some extra profit involved in the resale of the gold and jewelery worked out well. Why would you go into barter (exchange of goods) arrangements, unless you had a clear outlet for the goods that you were taking for your merchandise? The press reports indicate 'substantial prices are being offered in the United States for gold jewelery', and the recent arrest of persons at the airport with substantial amounts of stolen jewelery may be testimony to that.

I can understand the temptation to take hard currencies, like the US dollar, Canadian dollar, British Pound, or Euro, and even the EC dollar, in exchange for goods and services, especially if the customer appears to be a tourist. One could argue that it is a matter of convenience (even good service) to accommodate the visiting foreigners' lack of local currency. (Ironically, most of these same visitors would find it mighty strange for foreign currencies to be tendered in their countries.) Again, the risk of counterfeiting is there, as well as the fact that the foreign currencies are not legal tender, which should cause some sanction from the central bank. If your business needs foreign exchange, the existence of exchange controls makes it tempting to bypass the administrative limits and get foreign exchange directly, rather than through the banking system.

I wonder if the central bank has been looking closely at these kinds of developments in recent years and especially during the recession.

Thursday, March 25, 2010

An Extraordinary Week: Let's Play Pass The Parcel

It has been an extraordinary week in Barbados, culminating with a press conference held by PM David Thompson yesterday afternoon (see Advocate report). He gave what seems like the final word on whether a proposed concert and 'youth forum' featuring Jamaican dance hall artistes, Vybz Karkel (Adijah Palmer) and Mavado (David Brooks) would take place. It's now officially cancelled, after he met with the event promoters, just as the artistes were putting their toiletries together for the flight. Much public concern here had been raging about the spreading of the clear and sometimes violent rift between these two artistes and their fans, which has developed into what has been know as the 'Gaza' [Kartel] and 'Gully' [Mavado] feud. In Jamaica, it had several months ago gotten the attention of government, who wanted to see some easing in tensions between the factions with the government stating that it had reached a 'resolution' to the rift between the artistes (see link). Whatever merits the organizers claimed in their idea of bringing the artistes to Barbados for a show and to talk to young people about their new peace was lost on most people, who saw either another piece of public relations-turned marketing for the artistes. In addition, many saw it as another example of how a certain culture of disrespect and violence as portrayed and perpetuated through music was going to be allowed to spread and undermine values, especially amongst impressionable youths. The dispute here has done much for the recognition of the two artistes, whose music is no less accessible now than before and did not need an actual show to spread. But they now have a new, albeit varied and older audience as parents (perhaps for the first time) decided to listen to a kind of music many do not like or understand. The arguments were sometimes clear but also confused, but raised again many issues about freedom of movement, who could and should determine standards, parenting, youth development, decision making, role models, copying trends from abroad, and much more.

But the subplot to whether the show would go on was a show itself, with decisions changing as often as babies need diapers. We had the head of the police force, Commissioner Dottin, standing up and saying he did not approve of the show/concert only for his Deputy Commission Bertie Hinds to give approval for the show, just as Mr. Dottin was on his way to the airport. The Commissioner was not a happy camper and so he told the Nation: "It sends a very bad image and message that the Commissioner of Police has been having discussions on these issues and nobody had the decency to consult him....It reflects very poorly on the administration of the force." It's been an open secret that communication at the top of the police tree had its own special branch that was virtually non-existent, so no wonder the Commissioner was out on a limb. The PM ducked the issue nicely in his press conference when he said that "I will say there have been press reports about less than acceptable communication." Roger that! But with a Commissioner named Darwin should we speculate about who will survive any fight of the fittest?

The other bizarre event (or incident) involves an altercation in Parliament, which reportedly occurred last Friday during and after the Estimates Debate. The Worm cartoon in Monday's Nation was again really on target, with its depiction of an 'alleged incident' in the precincts of Parliament between Cabinet Minister, David Estwick, and Deputy Leader of the Opposition, Dale Marshall. Allegations include the brandishing of a firearm. The PM has decided that a bipartisan committee should look into matters of parliamentary procedures and privileges, and include not just politicians but media, clergy and others who could offer insight and input. But the current matter is for the Speaker of the House of Assembly to deal with. The matter was aired publicly by Mr. Owen and Miss Mottley at a BLP branch meeting at St. Leonard's School last Sunday. Reports suggest that Mr. Marshall has filed a formal complaint with the Speaker about the incident. This whole matter puts the government in a pickle as it deals with certain kinds of threats to society and less than stellar public behaviour and morals on one hand and has to deal with other similar threats in its midst.

There's also the uncomfortable situation brewing over the sentencing of the man responsible for the death of a Canadian tourist at Long Beach, after he hit her over the head with a piece of wood in an attempted robbery. The judge gave a sentence of 10 years to Curtis Joel Foster on a charge of manslaughter, well towards the lower end of possible sentences even though mitigating circumstances were slight. A lot of public surprise was expressed at what some would call 'insufficient punishment'. In keeping with that view, the Director of Public Prosecution is referring the matter to the Court of Appeal (see Nation report), arguing that the sentence does not reflect the gravity of the offence. As reported in the paper, citing the document on which the appeal is based:

"It is contended...that the sentence of ten years imprisonment imposed on [Foster] for the offence of manslaughter is unduly lenient in the circumstances.

"It is also contended that the sentence does not reflect the gravity of the offence.

"It is also contended that the sentence does not reflect the public's concern about offences of this nature.

"Moreover, there is an error of principle in the sentencing in the circumstances".

A space to be watched with much interest.

Then there is CLICO, which some say has become a political football. Stung by comments about the size of its statutory deficit, the company took out paid adverts in the papers 'categorically' deny that it was B$300 million. It did accept that the deficit was about this figure in 2008 and is now about B$100 million, but there is an accounting exercise for 2009 to be done by end April, which may move that figure around. Then in today's Advocate (page 7), CLICO's Executive Chairman, Leroy Parris, makes a statement taking to task the former PM, Owen Arthur, and 'responding to scurrilous attacks on my integrity by certain Barbados Labour Party (BLP) member, especially former Prime Minister Owen Arthur'. If it was a political football before, I dread to think what it has become now. A medicine ball?

It would be unoriginal to say that we live in interesting times, but I have to say we live in interesting times.

Tuesday, March 16, 2010

Fool Me Once, Shame On You. Fool Me Twice, Shame On Me

Several months ago, I wrote about some issues to do with the credibility of government and governing (search 'credit ratings', for example, and see Do Good Things Come To Those Who Wait? Economists Talk About Issues?). Much of that concern comes right back and hits me in the eye when I listen to what government spokespersons, mainly the Finance Minister/PM have been saying recently about things economic. I wont spend many words on them, because it appears to reflect much indecision, which has been costly, but just note the to-ing and fro-ing in four particular areas There's a reason to not spend too much time on the details of the Estimates that are now being thrashed over in Parliament, not least because they are estimates (and I know how to do that and it's more art at best than science), but also if the overall picture is a mess and unclear then what clarity can one get from the details that make that up? But looking at the problem areas where clear paths seem to have come and go like day and night.

Asset sales: First it was the plan to sell shares in BNB and ICBL to fund rebuilding/renovation of the QEH. Then it was talking about raising the governemtn ownership of BNB so that it could again become a 'national' bank. Then back we come to planning sell BNB and ICBL shares to fund QEH improvements. Is your head spinning yet. The Exorcist was a horrible movie.

Ratings downgrades and warnings and international borrowing: When Standard and Poor's made its downgrade of Barbados last November, one of the comments from the central bank governor was that Barbados was 'not going the route of borrowing on the international market, choosing to use less expensive sources of funding', and therefore concern about a worsening view from credit ratings agencies could be lessened. But here we are hearing from the Finance Minister yesterday that Barbados will go to the market to raise US$ 200 million at the maturity in June of a US$100 million bond. So, what was not a concern in the mind of the central bank governor may now be a concern as Barbados tests the international borrowing waters. But guess what? Several months ago concerns about high budget deficits and possible sovereign defaults was very muted, Since then, we have had the debacle of Dubai and very recently the greasy pole of Greece's financial and fiscal problems, and renewed talk that so-called solid sovereign borrowers like the UK and USA may see the loss of their AAA rating. Let's see what a welcome there is at the doorway for Barbados. If you want to think about happy ever after in the market place, remember The Beatles song, Oh-bla-di, Oh-bla-da, with 'Life goes on, bra. Lala, how the life goes on'.

CLICO/CL Financial: This is really something that may become a horror movie before our eyes. An unbelievable amount of time has been lost or wasted dealing badly with the affairs of this entity, and with about as much transparency as you get by looking through a wool blanket. During the Estimates debate the FM/PM told Parliament that the proposed sale of CLICO International Life has proven to be very difficult (see Advocate, March 16, page 3). I'm not really going to who has seen the Memorandum of Understanding between CLICO Holdings (Barbados) and the Ministry of Finance. If Parliament has not seen it then we have serious governance issues.

Supervision of nonbank financial institutions: The icing on the cake comes with the belated announcement/decision by the Supervisor of Insurance that CLICO and British American Insurance must now cease and desist from writing new policies and both be put under judicial management (see Nation report). Should have been done a year or so ago. You have a hole and don't know how deep it is and where it will hit water and you keep digging?

Friday, March 05, 2010

Warning Signs Were Present Of Downturn: Interview With The Barbados Advocate

The following article appeared in the Advocate on March 4, and reflects an interview I had with Jewel Brathwaite on February 19.

As my friends know, I have not suddenly changed nationality, but I will now ride with this new appellation for a while and see how it is to write and comment as one of 'us' not one of 'them'.

******************************************
Warning signs were present of downturn


BARBADIAN Economist, Dennis Jones believes that while for the most part the global financial crisis caught many people by surprise, there were warnings that such a downturn was very imminent.

In a recent interview with the Barbados Advocate, Jones, a former employee of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), said that warnings were sounded at least five years ago and that those making the predictions were considered as doomsayers.

“There were people who having analysed the financial situation in the middle of this decade, predicted that there would be a financial crash, and not everyone paid attention,” according to him.

He told the Barbados Advocate that these people, including economists and financial market analysts felt the crash was imminent given the way the world economy was moving along.

“However, the general feeling in the world back then was that such views were not the ones that foretold the future,” said Jones.

“So that when things started to go bad in 2007 for most people, it came as a surprise whereas for others who predicted the downturn it was a case of we told you so,” according to the Economist.

Jones pointed out that while some people in the financial world protected themselves while most people had protected themselves others saw the unfolding events people as a surprise.

“The majority of news reporting on financial situations tended to be positive since people preferred positive news to bad news,” according to him.

Several analysts including representatives of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had cautioned that the large twin deficits -fiscal and current account – which had dotted the American economy were unsustainable.

However, the crash came when the two large housing market players Fannie Mae and Freddie Mack ran into financial crisis. This followed a number of other key financial institutions either folding or being propped up by huge capital injections and the rest is now history. A number of countries have fallen victim to the crash deemed as the worst since the global depression of the the 1930. Barbados is among them.

As to how long the crisis will last, Jones said he does not know. However, he acknowledged that that the tendency in “Barbados is for people to suggest that we endure some pain but not too much and not too long.”

According to him, “You cannot predict how long this is going to be because Barbados is not the master of its destiny.” (JB)

Saturday, February 13, 2010

Hold strain? Come again...

I read in today's Nation (page 6) that the Governor General is to get a new car, costing B$190,000, a spanking new Audi A4 sedan, reported to be the first of its kind on the island. I wont hide the fact that I find that report distressing as an indication of the wrong message to send to a nation at this time. As an indication of essential spending in a recession this passes no test that I could devise. If someone wants to tell me about prestige and image, I would say that when you are supposedly down to your shoes bottom those things should not be your concern.

I read in the same paper (page 3) that the Barbados Tourism Authority has had to pull out of promoting Crop Over during Trinidad's Carnival 'because of financial cuts': last year, they and the National Cultural Foundation spent B$80,000 on the same promotion, which was instrumental in bringing about 5,000 people from Trinidad for Crop Over.

Just three nights ago, the PM was discussing economic issues and talking about 'moratorium' as his angle, not wage freeze (see Nation report). I'm not going to get into semantics and what will make a moratorium (a delay or suspension) different from a freeze. All will be made clear soon when the PM meets the social partners. During the press conference, the PM is reported to have 'again pleaded with Barbadians to hold strain as Government attempted to battle the current worldwide recession by finding a mid-term solution'. He defended free bus fares for schoolchildren, and will continue the roll-out of the "controversial" Constituency Councils. He said that Barbados’ main challenge now was to repair the fiscal deficit, not deplete foreign reserves. The Prime Minister also took the opportunity to thank the private sector for holding back from lay-offs across the board, saying it had “pulled its weight.”

Today I also see a report citing the PM saying that 'Government will seek to protect taxpayers’ interests at all costs' (see Advocate report). The report stated 'Thompson stressed the need for such action, noting that it was the Government’s responsibility to maximise taxpayers’ returns, while also ensuring that their money was also well spent.'

I read about the plight of the QEH and junior doctors' complaints about the poor conditions and lack of facilities for them.

I recall just a week ago how the country did not have the resources to offer even one bed space to Haitians affected by the earthquake.

I am wondering how all of that sits together. If someone were asked to describe the government's attitude to holding strain in its affairs what conclusions would they draw? If asked what were the nation's priorities, what would they say? If asked if government were truly standing shoulder to shoulder with the private sector in carrying the burden of the recession would they agree?

Sunday, February 07, 2010

Eating Frozen Custard: Government Minister Uses the F- Word

When Dr. David Estwick broached the idea this week that a wage freeze was something to consider (see Nation report) everyone should have known that life would never be the same again. When I read the headlines, they took me by surprise because earlier in the day when they made front page news, a local business journalist had asked me what advice I would give the government to deal with its economic and financial plight. My view was that the government needed to grapple seriously with its spending--which it had not shown a willingness to do so far. That meant looking hard at what it did and justifying every single dollar. That process should point out where savings could be made now or very soon and where savings could be made over a longer period. I said that the PM should ask every spending Minister to do that and come back with proposals for savings. Those who were not capable or willing to do that would have it done for them by the Finance Minister--the PM wearing another hat. Those spending curbs were not necessarily to be immediate, because the recession gives the government the excuse to keep spending high to cushion the tendency for the economy to fall as the private sector is struggling. But, government spending has to be high quality and should not be protected if it is wanton and wasteful.

Government's options were narrowing so not dealing with the spending issue as a medium term consideration was merely postponing the inevitable: the debt burden was rising and would show no tendency to do otherwise. Government would also in the process of reviewing spending have to stiffen itself to take some very unpleasant decisions. It was not necessarily that people would need to lose their jobs or take pay cuts or see no pay increases. It was also that some of the privileges public servants enjoy would need to be things of the past. Sure, you may not be able to make the needed changes without some negotiation but that process needed to be engaged.

Ordinary people have commented publicly about luxury vehicles for public servants. Why should any public servant be driven in, or drive, a BMW? When chips were down in Guinea during my term there, the government took back all the four wheel drive vehicles from Ministers and officials and gave them small saloons--Toyota Corollas; that in a country with terrible roads and real mountains to traverse. It showed in some way a sharing of the burden. Now, Toyota's current safety issues may suggest that they would not get the contract, but the principle is clear. Government does not generally create much of the national wealth, so why should it have free reign to spend it? Do public officials need to fly in a class other than coach? Does expanding overseas representation make real sense now? What is the bang for the buck that is expected? If you cannot show any, don't do it.

The government on several occasions has seemed hell bent on manufacturing the worst public relations situation for itself. To me, this is yet another attempt. Why would you want to broach the notion of freezing people's spending power when you have touted curbing the cost of living, but done little to make that a reality. Then why do it just days after a public agency has granted what many would see as another swingeing increase in a basic utility? The justification for the increase by Barbados Light and Power (BL&P) has been poorly made. After the increase was agreed, BL&P's officers tried to talk to the matter in the mainstream media. What was wrong with an attempt to explain ahead of the decision? The arguments were the same. All that most people will see is that water rates went up 60%: government did that. Now electricity rates will rise 10%: government allowed them to do that. LIME was close behind, proposing increases in land line rates: government has no means to stop them doing that. So, costs of living for most people were set to rise by substantial amounts, all due to government action or complicity. Then, the government says, "Santa forgot to give you a gift. Here, take a freeze in pay." Ordinary people will see this as callous disregard for their problems. How can they try to make ends meet? They cannot default on their utility bills without perhaps suffering worse by getting disconnected. I go back to the matter of arrears, where no real efforts seemed to have been made to try to get back a sou owed to BWA before imposing a rate increase.

When Dr. Estwick described the freeze as "something we have to do...We don't have a choice. We don't have the fiscal space" he may be right, but that is not a situation that came about last weekend. So, his uttering the f- word should not have been last week but many months ago. Was it political courage that was lacking why it was not even mentioned. Those who read the IMF Article IV consultation report say there that amongst the options the government had to consider was wage 'moderation'. So, why not prepare the ground? Blurting it out, without first referring to the social partners smacks of 'stick it'. It's not designed to 'get to yes' easily.

The economist in me can see the sense in what the government appears to want to do, but it is such an unhitched wagon they are driving that I have to wonder if I am just being too understanding. Government has done a poor job in putting in front of people a vision of the economic future that is not about waiting for the recession to end to get back to normal. They have not suggested that the 'new normal' will be a prolonged lowering of living standards in Barbados, even though that message has been aired abroad for some time. By taking that approach, it seems alright to not address any deep seated problems in the economy--and in society, more broadly. As I commented about the 2009 Budget, an opportunity was missed to deal radically with structural issues. Barbados' problems are not getting solved by holding breath. Issues of productivity, competitiveness, value for money, service delivery, straight forward inefficiency, and more have been there for anyone to see for a long time. But, when times are good one can paper over those cracks, and pretend that the bad smell is coming from next door's yard. Like Madoff and his Ponzi scheme, one can pretend in those good times that there are real gains to share, when it was really spinning a wheel. As they say, when the tide goes out you can see who was swimming naked.

Monday, February 01, 2010

Broad Street Journal Breakfast Club Resumes

Pat Hoyos, publisher of 'Who's Who in Barbados Business' and sometime moderator of VOB's 'Down to Brass Tacks', has restarted his monthly Broad Street Journal Breakfast Club. Today, he had Prof. Avinash Persaud speaking on the topic 'The ins and outs of the Four Seasons rescue and its role in upgrading of our tourism sector'.

Just over 30 persons, mainly business executives, and a few journalists, were present at Accra Beach Hotel, from 7.30 am, to hear Prof. Persaud go over some of the background to the recent rescue and his role in that; he spiced things up a little with some look behind the scenes. I wont rehearse the topic here as it has been well covered here and elsewhere over recent weeks.

I welcome opportunities being offered to discuss pertinent topics, so it will be nice if this forum takes off again, albeit with its relatively narrow basis of participants. But, I will try to flag upcoming breakfasts and I am sure that the more interest the better.

Friday, January 29, 2010

Constrain Banks In Booms

My ever-busy fellow economist also now living in Barbados, Avinash Persaud, has produced another thought-provoking piece about financial crises and their regulation. This time, in a round table discussion on The Economist 'free exchange' (see article). I take the liberty of reproducing the piece here:

Bail-in roundtable: Address the boom

Avinash Persaud is Chairman of Intelligence Capital Limited, and Chairman of the Warwick Commission on Financial Regulation. For an explanation of this roundtable, click here.

DESPITE the mantra that banking is a global industry needing global regulation, what has emerged instead has been a series of national responses and regional perspectives. In Europe, perhaps belying an instinctive mistrust of markets, the emphasis has been on how to regulate financial markets to avoid future crises. Credit mistakes are made during the boom, not during the crash. Besides, it is impossible to do good policy during a crash. Ideas around counter-cyclical charges and minimum liquidity buffers have traction. In the US, perhaps reflecting an instinctive mistrust of government, the emphasis is on resolving a crisis only once it has emerged. Booms are impossible to stop, so lets minimise the impact of the inevitable bust. Dominating the US debate are issues of “TBTF” (too big to fail) and “contingent capital”. Paul Callello’s and Wilson Ervin’s interesting “bail-in” proposals fit most neatly with this “American perspective”.

Messrs Callello and Ervin have focused on how we avoid an enormous liquidity crisis that stems from a more modest capital shortage. Quickly forcing the conversion of a limited amount of unsecured debt into equity might shore up capital and so forestall a liquidity crisis that, left unchecked, would create a bigger capital problem. There is merit in this idea from the perspective of the individual firm and its stakeholders. Instead of a bankruptcy that would wipe out the shareholders and much of the unsecured lenders, a middle path is chosen, of organised haircuts of the unsecured creditors, that allows everyone to survive. This is not dissimilar to provisions in the US bankruptcy code for industrial companies. However Messrs Callello and Ervin rightly argue that financial firms need a more immediate response. It is also not dissimilar from the idea of contingent capital, but Mr Callello and Mr Ervin believe the voluntary market for debt-that-can-become-equity would not be sufficiently large—which should give us pause for thought.

The problem with these and other contingent instruments are clearer from a macro perspective. What we are essentially doing is adding a forced option to unsecured lenders to banks, to convert their credit into something they do not want (a piece of equity), at some future date. In market parlance we are forcing a “put” onto unsecured debt. Markets and private rating agencies are better than governments at most things, but one thing they have consistently proven to be bad at is pricing risk through the economic cycle. Recall that the markets gave Bear Sterns, Lehman Brothers and Northern Rock higher equity ratings (p/e ratios) than they gave HSBC, JPMorgan and other survivors. This “put” will be underpriced during the boom, but when the first whiffs of bust are smelled, the price will shoot up and short-term subordinated credit to banks will dry up. This could bring forward a crisis.

One way to address this may be to give a pre-determined limit to the size of the put—perhaps a maximum of 15% of the unsecured debt can be forced to be converted into equity, limiting the panic in the unsecured market when it becomes clear that these options will be exercised by the regulators. The unsecured creditor is essentially now providing a limited facility to allow a bank to work through its problem. Should the bank survive, this equity could be re-converted into debt.

But there is a second more fundamental problem with these market mechanisms. Crashes are not random. They always follow booms. Appropriately defined, busts cannot be systematically smaller than the preceding booms. Consequently, proposals to reduce the severity of the crash will always be inadequate if they do nothing to address the boom. This proposal does nothing to the boom at best and potentially makes it worse. Booms are both caused and prolonged by the market’s underestimation of risk—often triggered by a new technology that appears to permanently improve the risk-return trade-off, such as railways, motor cars, electricity, the Internet and financial innovation. In the boom, the risk of unsecured debt is and will be systematically underestimated. The rise of under-priced unsecured debt could be perceived as less of a risk to the bank because it is now a form of contingent capital. This allows a bank to expand its balance sheet even more than otherwise. It will not curb the boom and could even add fuel to its flames. By doing nothing to the boom, all we may be doing is lessening the immediate severity of the crash by prolonging the downturn as banks find it very costly to raise unsecured debt in the aftermath of the crash. The history of financial crises is littered with good intentions.

The problem we need to address is a market underestimation of risk that feeds the boom. We require non-market mechanisms that raise the amount of capital banks are carrying as the boom progresses. Having more capital will be far more expensive for banks than this form of convertible debt, but it would provide the same buffer for the emergence of boom-fed credit mistakes and better constrain the boom in the first place. These non-market mechanisms can include the minimum funding liquidity and time varying capital adequacy requirements currently being worked on by the Financial Stability Board and Basel Committee. Alongside these initiatives, improving the power, scope and speed of resolution authorities may help to contain a crisis, but doing this on its own is not an adequate alternative to the main task of offsetting the market's systematic underestimation of risk in booms.

Risks To Image: Issues With Supervision Of Non-banks

The following press notice was issued this week, and raised more than one of my eyebrows.

NFA permanently bars Barbados futures firm and bars principal for three years

January 27, Chicago - National Futures Association (NFA) has permanently barred Kingz Capital Management Corporation (KCM) from NFA membership. KCM was registered as a Commodity Trading Advisor and Commodity Pool Operator located in Barbados. NFA also barred David M.S. Krywenky, the firm's principal, for three years.

The Decision, issued by an NFA Hearing Panel, is based on an NFA Complaint filed in September 2009 and a settlement offer submitted by KCM and Krywenky.

The Complaint charged KCM and Krywenky with failure to uphold high ethical standards and failure to supervise. The Complaint also charged KCM with cheating, defrauding or deceiving another person or attempting to do so.

Following his three-year bar, if Krywenky applies for associate NFA membership with any NFA Member, he must pay a $25,000 fine.

The complete text of the Complaint and Decision can be found on NFA's website (www.nfa.futures.org).

NFA is the premier independent provider of innovative and efficient regulatory programs that safeguard the integrity of the futures markets.

Regulation of so-called 'non-banks' in Barbados is weak and unless the government and central bank act quickly to set up the Financial Services Commission to do this, we could be looking into a shattered mirror, as Barbados' current reputation as a solid jurisdiction based on a conservative approach to regulation of banks, becomes that of a rogue jurisdiction, because of the poor regulation of non-banks.

Sunday, January 17, 2010

The Barbados Economy In 2009 And The Prospects For 2010: A Commentary

When the Central Bank of Barbados released its latest economic review on January 11, covering the last quarter of 2009 and the year as a whole, I was called by the Nation to offer an immediate reaction. The 500 words offered were reworked as shown below and published on January 12 (or see link). The piece needs one clarification. 'Reserve cover' is the amount of a country's international reserves of foreign assets relative to its imports of goods and services, usually expressed in terms of weeks, which is not how the text reads (see red highlights). In Barbados' case, the forecast is that reserves will decline from 21 weeks in 2009 to about 17 weeks in 2010.
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Concern over dependence on foreign markets

HEAVY RELIANCE ON BRITAIN as a tourist market may spell trouble in the future for Barbados.

That was the view of economist Dennis Jones, speaking after the release of the Central Bank's report: The Barbados Economy In 2009 And The Prospects For 2010.

"For tourism, the governor said there will be a small contraction in 2010, with recovery beginning only in 2011. This assumes modest economic growth in Barbados' major trading partners (the United States and Britain). But . . . Britain is one of the few industrial economies to still be in recession," Jones said.

"One result of this weak recovery is that reserve cover (the amount of imports the country has stored) will decline in 2010 [which] is a notable negative going forward and should be watched carefully."

In his report, Governor of the Central Bank Delisle Worrell said net international reserves were projected to decline this year and foreign reserves cover may revert to the levels of 2008 - around 17 per cent.

Jones was concerned the island's growth was so dependent on foreign markets.

"Barbados will not be in paradise next year and, in the governor's eyes, when it gets there depends greatly on the fortunes of the North American and European economies," he said. "I cannot fault the governor for his realism, but I wish there was more that we could do but hope."

Describing the fiscal outlook as "bleak", Jones noted that the deficit widened to 8.6 per cent from 6.4 per cent in 2008 as the economy contracted more than expected.

"But this was a pincer move," he said, adding: "Tax income declined, in part due to a shrinking tax base, and corporate tax income was especially hit. But spending rose by three per cent, with wages soaring 11 per cent from 1.7 per cent in 2008, and spending on goods and services was up 12 per cent. Borrowing locally and from Trinidad helped fill the widening gap." (LW)

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The Governor, in the press conference held on January 12, noted his emphasis on maintaining the current fixed rate of the Barbados dollar to the US dollar and the risks to that posed by the projected decline in reserves (see Nation report).


Monday, January 11, 2010

Should Barbados Consider Selling Public Sector Assets?

The following is an article I was requested to write for the Barbados Business Authority: it was published today.


Barbados is now unquestionably a highly indebted country, that needs to improve its public finances as its key debt ratios move into the chilly air countries breathe when their ratio of debt to GDP exceeds 100 percent. IMF data in its 2009 Article IV Consultation report show Barbados' public sector debt was due to end 2009 at 116% of GDP and would exceed 131% by 2014. Public debt rose quickly in the previous half decade: the ratio rose from 87% in 2004. Another measure of the 'pain' is the ratio of debt to revenue, which rose from 185% in 2004 to 224% in 2009 and may reach 239% in 2014. Simply put: the economy is not growing as fast as the debt, and significantly government revenue growth is also lagging the rise in debt. These are worrisome developments. So, how to solve them?

Few ways exist to reduce these debt burdens quickly, especially during a recession, when the government finds it harder to cut spending and raise revenue, being tempted to do the reverse to help boost the economy. One option to give Barbados some breathing room while it tries to improve its public finances on a sustainable medium term basis may be to sell some government assets and use the proceeds to help pay off some of the debt. That would ease the immediate debt burden and ongoing obligations that come from having to repay interest and principal. Last October, the UK government announced a £16 billion programme of asset sales as part of a deficit reduction plan to bring down the massive state debt built up during the recession(see http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/6305708/Gordon-Brown-unveils-16-billion-asset-sales.html). Britain is no stranger to high debt burdens or to asset sales.

One problem with implementing such ideas in Barbados is knowing what assets the government has and their worth. As the IMF reported in its 2007 Fiscal Transparency Report (see http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr07338.pdf), we have only a partial set of data about government financial assets and liabilities:

'Information on central government financial assets is published monthly and annually but is incomplete. The monthly and annual financial reports of the Accountant General that are tabled in Parliament contain statements of the central government’s financial assets ... However, the statements do not provide a full picture of all financial assets, such as equity investments in public enterprises.'

Simply, the country does not know what the government is worth. That makes it hard to know how much we could reasonably expect from selling public assets, even without discussions about their value and possible buyers.'

Asset sales help reduce the debt burden, but such sales also let a government reconsider its overall policy of economic involvement. Is a wider policy of divestment appropriate? The government may want to review why some of its debts were incurred, and if these were initially for temporary or good historical reasons, whether those reasons remain. The government has shed assets in the recent past by selling some of its part of a rehabilitated Barbados National Bank. The government could offload its holdings in hotels or tourism-related activities. The government may also review providing certain goods and services which could very adequately be done by the private sector. It needs breathing space from fiscal burdens so no options should be off the table.

Sunday, January 03, 2010

There Is A Four Seasons....Turn, Turn, Turn...

One of the most visible signs of the economic problems facing Barbados has been the stalling of the Cinnamon 88/Four Seasons/Paradise hotel and private residences project on the west coast. It has had its share of international interest not least because of the media glitterati who stood to go up in smoke and ashes if the project disappeared without trace. Simon Cowell, of American Idol fame, being among that group, which could easily have been renamed "I'm here again, idle".

Today's papers indicate that this is now set to resume (see Advocate report). In a deal brokered by Professor Avinash Persaud, the project will be refinanced, with the agreement of lenders, creditors, private residence owners, shareholders and developers. Kudos to Prof. Persaud for getting the parties to agree on this. The Barbados Government puts itself into the frame as a supporter too: the deal will allow Government to gain an equity share in the project, while guaranteeing the repayment of the loan. The plan includes a US$60 million facility from Ansa McAL Merchant Bank and its Barbadian affiliate, Consolidated Finance, that allows for a repayment of the Bank of Scotland loan, the acquisition of the Esso land to complete the site, a settlement with creditors, and the recommencement of construction.

The government will have a ‘golden share’ to guarantee its interests versus other shareholders and a charge on the assets of the most significant development to occur in Barbados for some time. The PM is clearly optimistic about the whole thing, saying "When these dark days of global economic challenge are behind us, we will come to see this moment as one of our finest hours.” Words like that have a habit of coming back to haunt, and one wonders whether Barbados en masse, with its already heavy debt burden will see the government guarantee in the same Churchillian 'finest hours' terms. While the government may enjoy eating a lovely cinnamon-toasted bagelnow, I hope that it does not end up with just toast, or the hole in the bagel.

The deal calls for the creation of a new management board to be appointed under the Executive Chairmanship of Prof. Persaud.

It's clearly too early to say whether or not this is a good deal. The project, stalled for many months in 2009, has yet to restart, but that is foreseen this calendar quarter. A lot of people have not been working or earning while the project lay idle, and their prospects are less bleak, though not clearly bright. Some contractors are owed monies too for work done previously. As contracts are being re-tendered, it's not clear who will be working again, or working anew, and who will be paid and when. Will Chinese workers be retained? Will Bajan workers and companies get a piece of the pie? Will former management be pushed out and have reason to cry 'foul'? Whose arm will be twisted and nose tweaked to ensure that these aspect does not turn into a PR disaster for the government? So, we may have some contentious months ahead in sorting that out.

The role of government may also come in for some scrutiny. I'm happily reading "Too Big To Fail", about how the US financial world dealt with the turmoils of the sub-prime crisis, and how government had to step in to save some institutions but did not step up for others. Economists often worry about 'moral hazard', where a party by being protected from certain risks acts differently than they should. It will be a matter to be tested whether the government's stepping in is seen as needed in a 'too big to fail' sense, or if it suggests that it may have to do so more widely to help the economy weather the current economic storm. Skeptics will also be looking to see if and when the government steps away, or if this public holding of private hands is a new dance that will be hitting the floors this year.

Sunday, December 20, 2009

I Big Up Me Friend, Avi

Prospect magazine, which has a reputation as the most intelligent current affairs and cultural debate magazine in Britain, has produced a 'brains trust list' of those who have contibuted best to the "public conversation" during these turbulent times? Prospect names the top 25 brains of the financial crisis (see http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2009/12/public-intellectuals-and-the-financial-crisis/). So, in the same week when Time Magazine named Ben Bernanke "person of the year", it's interesting to see who else in the financial field has been given a big personality. For Prospect, their winner is Simon Johnson, Professor at MIT, Peterson Institute fellow and former IMF chief economist, whom they deem 'a worthy winner'. Below is their discussion of their choices and the list. But, notable names are close to the top, including my friend and neighbour--Barbados is small--Avinash Persaud, who gets the silver medal. Well done, Avi!
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The financial crisis has destroyed both wealth and received wisdom. The idea that prices are always right and markets self-correct is fatally challenged. Even Alan Greenspan admits that the “whole intellectual edifice” of the efficient market hypothesis collapsed in the summer of 2008. The financial establishment is in a state of deep confusion. As the FT’s Gillian Tett put it in September’s Prospect: it is like “a priest who has lost faith in the Bible, but still has to go to church.” But this is not a bad thing, for it has opened up new ways of thinking about markets, institutions and the all-important cause of financial reform.

Unfamiliar voices have come to prominence, aided by a new wave of financial bloggers eager to push fresh ideas. But who has made the most impact? Prospect assembled a panel of experts to draw up a list of leading “public intellectuals” of the financial crisis in 2009 and then decide on the most important. Our criteria were simple. Anyone who had made an impact on policy with their ideas, or who had changed the “public conversation” was a candidate.

The panel sifted hundreds of names, with an unavoidable bias towards Britain and the US, but felt the most important contributions had been in financial reform—those trying to work out what to do next. The crisis has laid a staggering financial burden on the world, with some $14 trillion propping up US and EU banks. We cannot afford another one. Moreover, we urgently need a new regulatory philosophy. Are liquid markets always good? Is complexity in financial services harmful? Can finance firms stop “herding,” creating wild booms and busts?

The role of the banks themselves is also being rethought. They have mushroomed in size without doing a better job—Royal Bank of Scotland’s balance sheet grew 20-fold in the decade from 1998. Some banks have become too big to fail and hence dangerous. Should we return to the strict division between commercial and investment banking, as proposed by Paul Volcker and Mervyn King? And how can we now rein in this super-sized financial system with its powerful lobby? Many of the surviving megabanks have pressured governments for a return to the status quo ante. They want their old economy back, with the implicit warning that if they don’t get it there will be no recovery—and politicians will be blamed.

We considered all of this, and gradually whittled the names down to a shortlist of just 25 (see facing page), and then a top three. In reverse order, the bronze medal went to Adair Turner, chairman of Britain’s Financial Services Authority, who bravely questioned the social usefulness of some financial activity, and called for regulators to force banks to hold more capital against risky trades, cutting their profitability. Next, silver went to Avinash Persaud, a respected analyst who spotted nine years ago the dangerous interaction between firms “herding” and new risk management techniques. During 2009 he has been arguing for new “macro-prudential” regulation to stop what he discovered a decade ago.

But there was a clear winner. He is Simon Johnson, an economist at the prestigious Peterson Institute in Washington, DC, who has been leading the argument against overmighty banking. His ideas are well grounded in theory, but he has also done more than any academic to popularise his case: writing articles, a must-read blog, and appearing tirelessly on television. As the FT’s Martin Wolf told Prospect: “Johnson’s significance is that he is a member of the establishment—a former IMF chief economist, no less—who has emphasised the capture of the state by big finance, for the latter’s own ends. An expert on crises in emerging countries and in transition from communism, he has called what he has seen: crony capitalism at the heart of the financial system.” In particular Johnson’s essay “The Quiet Coup,” in the Atlantic of May 2009, is one of the great polemical essays of the crisis. Far from skulking in an ivory tower, he has urged citizens to the streets.

We need an informed debate about making finance safer. Johnson, Persaud and Turner led that debate in 2009.

PROSPECT’S TOP 25 BRAINS OF THE CRISIS

1. Simon Johnson Professor at MIT, Peterson Institute fellow, former IMF chief economist, blogger, troublemaker and scourge of once-mighty banks—a worthy winner in 2009.

2. Avinash Persaud Financial liquidity analyst, adviser to governments around the world, the man who has studied “herd” behaviour in finance, and now the man trying to stop it.

3. Adair turnerAn unusually bold regulator, Turner made headlines worldwide slamming “socially useless” finance (in Prospect) and suggesting a Tobin tax to put sand in the wheels of global finance.

Ben Bernanke Cerebral Federal Reserve chairman, seen by many as saviour of the US economy while congress dithered.

Andrew Haldane Bank of England director who warned of a “doom loop” of perpetual banking bailouts.

Philip Hildebrand Swiss banker who boldly pushed cutting his country’s banks to size.

John Kay Well-regarded British economist who wants a return to simple banking.

Mervyn King Bank of England boss, initially wrong-footed by the crisis, but had a better, more aggressive 2009.

Richard Koo Insider adviser to politicians and banks, an expert on the lessons from Japan, and deficit dove-in-chief.

Paul Krugman Celebrated economist and author of a must-read New York Times essay on the failures of economics.

Christine Lagarde French minister of economic affairs who got just the right mix of stick and carrot for French banks.
donald mackenzie Edinburgh professor, author of many sharp LRB essays unpicking the anthropology of finance.

Lucy Prebble 28-year-old British author of Enron, the best play yet on irrational exuberance.

Nouriel Roubini Legendarily gloomy, normally correct finance analyst whose blogs alone can move markets.

Brad Setser Young policy wonk, co-blogger with Simon Johnson and author of Bailouts or Bail-ins? with Roubini.

Robert Shiller Credit-crunch US sage and behavioural economics pioneer.

Jon Stewart Brainy American satirist whose Daily Show has made finance a laughing stock.

Joseph Stiglitz Nobel laureate, chair of UN commission on financial reform and harsh critic of finance-as-usual.

Matt Taibbi US journalist, wrote a celebrated scathing attack on Goldman Sachs.

Paul Volcker Ex-Fed chair, pushing for splitting up investment and savings banks.

Elizabeth Warren Harvard professor, consumer rights watchdog, leads the panel watching over Obama’s bailout money.

Martin Wolf FT writer and the Anglosphere’s most influential finance journalist.

Paul Woolley Innovative LSE thinker on “capital market dysfunctionality.”

Yu Yongding Influential economist at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

Zhou Xiaochuan Bank of China head, architect of China’s response to the crisis.

Thanks to those who helped us pick a list or select winners, including: Rudi Bogni, Diane Coyle, Will Davies, Meghnad Desai, John Eatwell, Christopher Hird, Will Hutton, Faisal Islam, Stephanie Flanders, George Magnus, Jasper McMahon, Felix Salmon, Richard Sennett, Rohan Silva, Laura Tyson, Isabel Hilton and Graham Turner

Friday, November 27, 2009

Professing To Know About Financial Regulation: A Bajan In The Lead

Barbados is fortunate to count among its current citizens several very talented economists. I'm lucky to know a few of them as friends. People's eyes pop at the kudos that flows to this small island from Rihanna's successes on the world stage, with or without provocative glimpses of her body and with or without more revealing or embarrassing details of her personal life. But they should also open wide when people like Dr. DeLisle Worrell, Professor Andrew Downes, or Professor Avinash Persaud go public on the international stage with much less flourish, and thankfully keeping all of their body parts well covered up. But, they really show how to punch above your weight, and reflect one aspect that the island needs to take more seriously: how to produce 'heavy weight' thinkers and policy makers who can hold their own in the rough and tumble of the international arenas.

Professor Persaud has many views about the current state of economic developments and policy in Barbados and it's worth reading them on a regular basis now that he is writing on the newly launched Barbados Business website (see http://www.barbadosbusiness.net/). This is quickly becoming a go-to place to read pertinent articles on the economics, finance, and business of Barbados and other Caribbean countries.

He has also been tilling some very obscure land in the area of international financial regulation, in particular as Chair of the so-called 'Warwick Commission'. Its report has just been published and I would recommend reading commentary on it in both The Economist and the Financial Times. I reproduce both below, for ease of access.

The Warwick Commission report and its executive summary are also available online (see http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/research/warwickcommission/report).

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Systems failure (see http://www.economist.com/businessfinance/economicsfocus/displaystory.cfm?story_id=14960099)

Nov 26th 2009
From The Economist print edition

Two new papers explore how to regulate the financial system as a whole

BANKS mimic other banks. They expose themselves to similar risks by making the same sorts of loans. Each bank’s appetite for lending rises and falls in sync. What is safe for one institution becomes dangerous if they all do the same, which is often how financial trouble starts. The scope for nasty spillovers is increased by direct linkages. Banks lend to each other as well as to customers, so one firm’s failure can quickly cause others to fall over, too.

Because of these connections, rules to ensure the soundness of each bank are not enough to keep the banking system safe. Hence the calls for “macroprudential” regulation to prevent failures of the financial system as a whole. Although there is wide agreement that macroprudential policy is needed to limit systemic risk, there has been very little detail about how it might work. Two new reports help fill this gap. One is a discussion paper from the Bank of England, which sketches out the elements of a macroprudential regime and identifies what needs to be decided before it is put into practice*. The other paper, by the Warwick Commission, a group of academics and experts on finance from around the world, advocates specific reforms**.

The first step is to decide an objective for macroprudential policy. A broad aim is to keep the financial system working well at all times. The bank’s report suggests a more precise goal: to limit the chance of bank failure to its “social optimum”. Tempering the boom-bust credit cycle and taking some air out of asset-price bubbles may be necessary to meet these aims, but both reports agree that should not be the main purpose of regulation. Making finance safer is ambitious enough.

Policymakers then have to decide on how they might achieve their goal. The financial system is too willing to provide credit in good times and too shy to do so in bad times. In upswings banks are keen to extend loans because write-offs seem unlikely. The willingness of other banks to do the same only reinforces the trend. Borrowers seem less likely to default because with lots of credit around, the value of their assets is rising. As the boom gathers pace, even banks that are wary of making fresh loans carry on for fear of ceding ground to rivals. When recession hits, each bank becomes fearful of making loans partly because other banks are also reluctant. Scarce credit hurts asset prices and leaves borrowers prey to the cash-flow troubles of customers and suppliers.

Since the cycle is such an influence on banks, macroprudential regulation should make it harder for all banks to lend so freely in booms and easier for them to lend in recessions. It can do this by tailoring capital requirements to the credit cycle. Whenever overall credit growth looks too frothy, the macroprudential body could increase the minimum capital buffer that supervisors make each bank hold. Equity capital is relatively dear for banks, which benefit from an implicit state guarantee on their debt finance as well as the tax breaks on interest payments enjoyed by all firms. Forcing banks to hold more capital when exuberance reigns would make it costlier for them to supply credit. It would also provide society with an extra cushion against bank failures.

Each report adds its own twist to this prescription. The Bank of England thinks extra capital may be needed for certain sorts of credit. If capital penalties are not targeted, it argues, banks may simply cut back on routine loans to free up capital for more exotic lending. The Warwick report says each bank’s capital should also vary with how long-lived its assets are relative to its funding. Firms with big maturity mismatches are more likely to cause systemic problems and should be penalised. The ease of raising cash against assets and of rolling over debt varies over the cycle, and capital rules need to reflect this. Regulators should also find ways to match different risks with the firms which can best bear them. Banks are the natural bearers of credit risk since they know about evaluating borrowers. Pension funds are less prone to sudden withdrawals of cash and are the best homes for illiquid assets.

The Warwick group is keen that macroprudential policy should be guided by rules. If credit, asset prices and GDP were all growing above their long-run average rates, say, the regulator would be forced to step in or explain why it is not doing so. Finance is a powerful lobby. Without such a trigger for intervention, regulators may be swayed by arguments that the next credit boom is somehow different and poses few dangers. The bank frets about regulatory capture, too, but doubts that any rule would be right for all circumstances. It favours other approaches, such as frequent public scrutiny, to keep regulators honest.
When banks attack

No regulatory system is likely to be fail-safe. That is why Bank of England officials stress that efforts to make bank failures less costly for society must be part of regulatory reform. That includes making banks’ capital structures more flexible, so that some kinds of debt turn into loss-bearing equity in a crisis. Both reports favour making systemically important banks hold extra capital, as they pose bigger risks when they fail.

The Warwick group also thinks cross-border banks should abide by the rules of their host countries, so that macroprudential regulation fits local credit conditions. That would require that foreign subsidiaries be independently capitalised, which may also be necessary for a cross-border bank to have a credible “living will”, a guide to its orderly resolution. This advice will chafe most in the European Union, where standard rules are the basis of the single market. But varying rules on capital could also be used as a macroeconomic tool in the euro area, where monetary policy cannot be tailored to each country’s needs. Regulation to address negative spillovers that hurt financial stability might then have a positive spillover for economic stability.

* “The role of macroprudential policy”, Bank of England, November 2009

** The Warwick Commission on International Financial Reform, November 2009



Boomtime politicians will not rein in the bankers (see http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8c0a1de4-dacf-11de-933d-00144feabdc0.html; login may be required).

By Avinash Persaud

Published, Financial Times: November 26 2009

One of the features that singles out the Warwick Commission on International Financial Reform, which publishes its final report on Friday, is that while other expert groups tiptoe around it, we have been able to point to the true source of the worst financial crisis since the 1930s: regulatory capture and boomtime politics.

Today regulators are working conscientiously to address the issue of banks being too big to fail; the lack of responsibility that can follow securitisation; imperfections in credit ratings; capital requirements which accentuate boom and bust; regulators which were global champions for their local banks; and more. But we should not forget that just a few years ago, regulators, with few exceptions, wanted big banks to have lower capital requirements if they had sophisticated risk models; they were cheerleaders for securitisation and asset sales by banks because, they said, this spread risks; they hard-wired credit ratings into bank risk assessment; they promoted home country regulation over host country control; and they dismissed the idea that regulation was dangerously pro-cyclical.

These and other regulatory mistakes all pushed financial institutions in the same direction. Large international banks compete better on “process” and “models” than credit assessment, and reap economies of scale when rules that segment finance within and between countries are liberalised. As I wrote here in 2002, financial regulation had all the hallmarks of being captured by banks, to the detriment of financial stability.

Separate but related to regulatory capture is the politics of booms. A boom persists because no one wants to stop it. The government of the day wants it to last until the next election. The early phase of a boom brings extra growth, low inflation and falling defaults. Governments tout this as a sign of their superior performance. Bankers argue such alchemy justifies their golden handshakes and excuses their golden handcuffs. Booms spread cheer by providing finance to the previously unbanked. Donations to worthy causes and universities temper traditional channels of criticism. How easily can the underpaid regulator stick his hand up and say it is all an unsustainable boom?

The capture and influence is subtle and there is always a genuine reason, if a wrong one, for why it is different this time. Indeed, one of the key challenges not yet seriously addressed is why the universities and press, falling over themselves to kick bankers today, did not play a more effective counterveiling (sic) force to this capture.

One indirect consequence of capture is the mistaken treatment of risk that lies at the heart of regulation. Many politicians and watchdogs think of risk as a single fixed thing inherent in instruments. As a result they put faith in processes that link capital to measures of risk, or in committees charged with determining what is safe and what is risky and banning the risky. But risk is a chameleon: it changes depending on who is holding it. Declaring something safe can make it risky and vice versa. Investment scams are attracted to booms, but booms are in fact built on the belief that some new thing has increased the return or reduced the risk of the world: motor cars, railroads, electricity, the internet or financial innovation. There is often a large element of truth about the original proposition – the world will be different – but the over-investment creates new risks.

In a world in which risk is poorly measured and regulators are vulnerable to political influence, we cannot rely as a defence against a crisis on the regulation of financial instruments, statistical measures of risk, systemic risk committees or the foreign “home country” regulator.

It is not financial instruments but behaviour we need to change. A better defence will come from increasing capital buffers at financial institutions, making these buffers counter-cyclical, and focusing on structural – not statistical – measures of risk capacity. Liquidity risk is best held by institutions that do not require liquidity, such as pension funds, life insurers or private equity. Credit risk is best held by institutions that have plenty of credit risks to diversify, such as banks and hedge funds. No amount of extra capital will save a system that, because measured risks in a boom are low, sends risk where there is no capacity for it.

The writer is chair of the Warwick Commission, chairman of Intelligence Capital and an emeritus professor of Gresham College

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As countries' regulators try to get closer in their chase for how to regulate financial institutions, one notion that Professor Persaud highlights is worth noting: the idea the risks change is often forgotten. In that vein, I touch again briefly on Barbados' standing with credit rating agencies. Simply, a good risk today is not a good risk forever. Remaining less risky for a country is a constant exercise in good management of economic and financial affairs. No one remembers last week's win, when you lose today; and if you lose again next week, look out to see how the fans start to head for the exits. The other point that is a sub text is that regulators who do not regulate properly can quickly and dangerously raise the riskiness of a country by simply not doing their job properly, and by leaving a nation ignorant of, and complacent about, the problems it has. If that hat fits any local regulators they better get refitted rapidly.